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IN BRIEFVOLUME97 MAY30, 2011 PAGES 23–29
ESSAY
MCDONALD’S OTHER RIGHT
Professor Samuel Wiseman*INTRODUCTIONS is widely known, in June 2010 the Supreme Court issued itsopinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago, holding that the Due Pro-­‐cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the SecondAmendment binding on the states.1 The strong public and scholarlyinterest in the case is due, in large part, to the controversial natureof the right that was incorporated, but also to excitement (at leastamong scholars) over the first incorporation in roughly forty years.2Despite this broad interest, one feature ofMcDonald appears to havegone so far unnoticed:3 the right to keep and bear arms is not thesole provision of the Bill of Rights that the opinion incorporates, for
* The author is an Assistant Professor at the University of Tulsa College of Law. Hereceived his J.D. from Yale Law School and his B.A. from Yale University.1 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).2 The last incorporation case was Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), which ap-­‐plied the prohibition against double jeopardy to the states. Id. at 794.3 This incorporation remains unnoticed even by those who have written about
McDonald. See, e.g., Dale E. Ho, Dodging a Bullet: McDonald v. City of Chicago and theLimits of Progressive Originalism, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 369, 380–81 (2010) (stat-­‐ing that “the Court has yet to analyze only two (relatively insignificant) individualrights found in the Bill of Rights for the purposes of incorporation: the Third Amend-­‐ment prohibition on the quartering of soldiers in private homes and the EighthAmendment right against excessive bails and fines”); Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Hector R.Lozada, A Nomination of a Supreme Court Justice: The Incorporation Doctrine Revisit-­‐ed, 35 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 365, 382–83 (2010) (stating that “the Court has yet to rule onthe applicability of the Eighth Amendment’s bar on ‘[e]xcessive bail’ to the states”).
A
  
24 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:23 the first time, against the states. This oversight is understandable,however, because while the incorporation of the Second Amend-­‐ment prompted over two hundred pages of opinions, the incorpora-­‐tion of the second provision, the Excessive Bail Clause of the EighthAmendment, required only a footnote.I. THE INCORPORATION OF THE EXCESSIVE BAIL CLAUSETo be fair, scholars’ oversight with respect to Eighth Amendmentincorporation is also understandable because the distinction beingdrawn here is a fine one. Whereas previously the Court had gone nofurther with respect to the Excessive Bail Clause than to say that ithad “been assumed” to apply to the states through the FourteenthAmendment,4 McDonald—citing a case in which neither party hadeven raised an Eighth Amendment issue—unequivocally places theprohibition against excessive bail among the incorporated rights ra-­‐ther than among those still in constitutional limbo.5 If there is anymeaningful difference between these statuses—and most,6 though
4 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (finding that “the Eighth Amendment’sproscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the statesthrough the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also Browning-­‐Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Dis-­‐posal, 492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(citing Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971)) (“In addition, the Court has assumedthat the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to the States.”); Bakerv. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (“We of course agree with the dissent’s quota-­‐tion of the statement from [Schilb] that ‘the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of exces-­‐sive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the FourteenthAmendment.’”); Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 659 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Nei-­‐ther the Supreme Court nor we have held that the Clause is incorporated against thestates.”); cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). In discussing cruel and unusualpunishment in 2008, the Court in Kennedy found that the entire Eighth Amendment ap-­‐plied to the states, finding, “The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States throughthe Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, norexcessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’” Id. at 419. Thisappears to have been judicial sloppiness rather than an accurate statement of the law,however, because just under two decades earlier, the Court in Browning-­‐Ferris statedthat it had never determined whether the excessive fines portion of the EighthAmendment applied to the states and specifically declined to decide whether it did. See
Browning-­‐Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262–64. The McDonald court confirms this, recognizing theCourt’s previous failure to decide the incorporation issue for excessive fines in Brown-­‐
ing-­‐Ferris. 130 S. Ct. at 3035, n.13.5 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034–35, nn.12–13 (citing Schilb, 404 U.S. at 365). This isdicta, certainly, but dicta from which return seems extremely unlikely.6 See Joshua Dressler & George C. Thomas, Dressler & Thomas’ Criminal Procedure:Principles, Policies, and Perspectives 793 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that incorporation of
  
2011] McDonald's Other Right 25 certainly not all7 scholars appear to have thought that there was—then, after pausing to solemnly mark the explicit guarantee of an-­‐
the right remains in question); Stephen G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual RightsUnder State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868:What Rights are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 7,82 (2008) (“It can be argued that the Supreme Court signaled its willingness to incor-­‐porate this right against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1971, alt-­‐
hough it has not technically done so thus far.”) (emphasis added); Mary M. Cheh, Consti-­‐tutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-­‐Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J.1325, 1383 n.298 (1991) (observing that “the Court has assumed that the excessivebail clause of the same amendment also applies to the states”); Nancy J. King, Portion-­‐ing Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. Pa.L. Rev. 101, 155, n.155 (1995) (noting that the Bail Clause “has been assumed” to applyto the states and citing Schilb); Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous:The Eight Amendment’s Right to Bail, 32 N. Ky. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2005) (arguing that “[t]heincorporation of the Eighth Amendment as applicable to the states has occurred indi-­‐rectly, if at all”); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31Ga. L. Rev. 1, 49 n.112 (1996) (describing Schilb as “apparently assuming that [the] Ex-­‐cessive Bail Clause is incorporated”); Jeremy M. Miller, The Potential for an Equal Pro-­‐tection Revolution, 25 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 287, 294 (2006) (explaining that “[t]hoseguarantees of the Bill of Rights still not enforced against the states by the FourteenthAmendment are the Second Amendment right to bear arms, the Fifth Amendment rightto an indictment by a grand jury, the Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause, [and]the Eighth Amendment bail clause”); Peter Preiser, Rediscovering a Coherent Rationalefor Substantive Due Process, 87 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 19, n.122 (2003) (stating that “[t]heEighth Amendment prohibition on excessive bail and excessive fines has never beenaddressed as a due process concern”); cf. Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining:Reassessing the Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1457, 1524 (2000)(“With regard to excessive bail and excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment, itseems hard to believe that the Court would not incorporate those rights if ever con-­‐fronted with the issue, especially given that the remaining Eighth Amendment guaran-­‐tee, against cruel and unusual punishments, has long been incorporated. The Court has,in fact, expressed in dicta an assumption that the Excessive Bail Clause applies to thestates through the Fourteenth Amendment.”).7 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 545–46 (3d. ed. 2009) (briefly list-­‐ing the unincorporated rights, and not including the Excessive Bail Clause); Akhil ReedAmar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1221, 1230 & n.33 (2002) (notincluding the Excessive Bail Clause among the list of the “only major exceptions” to in-­‐corporation); Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A Response toWilliam P. Gray, Jr., 49 Ala. L. Rev. 551, 569 n.80 (1998) (listing excessive bail as appli-­‐cable to the states and citing Schilb); Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalismand the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 483, 549–50 (1997) (stating that“the Warren Court incorporated against the states every right of the criminally accusedcontained in the Bill of Rights except the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of a grandjury indictment”); Lewis R. Katz,Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in America,52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 471, 479 (2001) (stating that “the Court made . . . the EighthAmendment right to be free from excessive bail applicable to the states”); Christopher J.Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1454, 1524, n.285
  
26 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:23 other of our constitutional liberties against infringement by stateand local governments, it remains to wonder how the Court couldhave been so cavalier. II. EXPLANATIONS
A. A Quiet End to Years of Presumed IncorporationPart of the answer to the footnote puzzle, of course, must surelybe that after years of assuming it to be the case, the Court felt it soobvious that the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Excessive BailClause to the states that it was unnecessary to wait for the issue tobe presented. Such a feeling would be understandable: employingthe standards reaffirmed in McDonald, the issue seems nearly freefrom doubt. If “the presumption of innocence, secured only aftercenturies of struggle, would lose its meaning” unless the “right tobail before trial is preserved,”8 then the prohibition against exces-­‐sive bail would certainly seem to be “fundamental to our scheme ofordered liberty and system of justice,” and “deeply rooted in this Na-­‐tion’s history and tradition.”9 A skeptic might question whether aright that only forty-­‐two percent of felony defendants are able to ex-­‐ercise10 can truly be fundamental, but if more proof were needed,then the fact that “[a]ll thirty-­‐seven state constitutions in 1868—every last one—provided that excessive bail shall not be required incriminal cases” should suffice.11
B. A Matter of IndifferenceAnother, less happy part of the explanation of the McDonaldCourt’s incorporation-­‐by-­‐footnote, though, may be that the issuelargely escaped the Court’s attention because the Excessive BailClause, as interpreted by the Court, has so little force that it simply
(2000) (describing Schilb as “incorporating Eighth Amendment prohibition of excessivebail”).8 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).9 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034, 3036.10 Thomas Cohen & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Felony Defend-­‐ants in Large Urban Counties 7 (2006), available athttp://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf.11 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 6, at 81.
  
2011] McDonald's Other Right 27 does not matter very much whether it applies to the states or not.Even for the Bill of Rights, the Clause is a model of succinct ambigui-­‐ty. As Representative Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire said inthe congressional debate over the Bill of Rights, “The clause seemsto express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no ob-­‐jection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think itnecessary. What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to bethe judges?”12 Livermore, of course, did not carry the day; it fell tothe courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to provide answers tothese very basic questions: how are we to determine what amountof bail is “excessive” (or appropriate) for a particular defendant?With reference to what principles or objectives?On one hand, the Clause could be read as a check on both the judi-­‐ciary and the legislature, guaranteeing that bail will not be excessivein light of some implicit conception of the legitimate uses of pretrialdetention—perhaps only in capital cases,13 or when necessary to thefunctioning of the judicial process.14 On the other hand, the Clausemay also be read as leaving the legislature free to determine wheth-­‐er and under what circumstances bail should be allowed. Undersuch a construction, the Clause serves only to prevent judges fromsetting bail higher than necessary to achieve whatever goal the leg-­‐islature has sought to achieve.15The Supreme Court largely resolved these questions in 1987 in
United States v. Salerno, when it considered a facial challenge to theprovisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 allowing detention for
12 1 Annals of Cong. 754 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., Washington, 1834), re-­‐
printed in 5 The Founders’ Constitution 377 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,1987), quoted in Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of1984: The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36Fordham Urb. L.J. 121, 128 (2009).13 Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 989(1965). For a fuller discussion of these scholars’ views, see Wiseman, supra note 12, at135–36 and accompanying footnotes; see also infra notes 13 through 15 and accompa-­‐nying text.14 See Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World ofJohn Mitchell, 56 Va. L. Rev. 371, 404 (1970).15 William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 Alb. L. Rev. 33, 86(1977); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952); Hermine H. Meyer,Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 Geo. L.J. 1139, 1179 (1972); John N. Mitchell,Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1223, 1225(1969).
  
28 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:23 dangerousness.16 The Court, after a brief textual and historical anal-­‐ysis, declined to decide whether the Eighth Amendment puts anylimit on “Congress’ power to define the classes of criminal arresteeswho shall be admitted to bail,” but concluded that “[t]he only argua-­‐ble substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government’sproposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ inlight of the perceived evil.”17 It then held that “when Congress hasmandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest” such aspreventing crime by arrestees, “the Eighth Amendment does not re-­‐quire release on bail.”18 While it may be an overstatement to say thatthe Court’s interpretation has left the Excessive Bail Clause “belowthe level of a pious admonition,”19 it is not merely coincidental thatit remains “one of the least litigated provisions in the Bill ofRights.”20With respect to challenges to legislative restrictions on pretrialrelease (assuming they exist), the goal blessed by Salerno—ensuringthe safety of the community (including, perhaps, safety from eco-­‐nomic harm)21—is broad enough by itself to allow detention formost felonies. After all, if the government’s interest in averting dan-­‐ger can help justify imprisoning the convicted for years,22 it wouldseem, in most cases, to justify detaining the presumptively innocent.Put another way, it is difficult to put a value—whether measured indollars or in days of pretrial detention—on the prevention of crime,and courts seem unlikely to second-­‐guess a legislature on such a cal-­‐culation except in extremely unusual cases. Nor does the EighthAmendment appear to impose many limits on how dangerousness isdetermined: under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, judges must consid-­‐er a wide range of factors when determining whether to detain a de-­‐fendant pretrial, including, among others, “the person’s character,physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial re-­‐
16 481 U.S. 739 (1987).17 Id. at 754.18 Id. at 754–55.19 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 556 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).20 Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 659 (9th Cir. 2007).21 See, e.g., United States v. Madoff, 316 F. App’x 58, 59–60 (2nd Cir. 2009); UnitedStates v. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 192–93 (9th Cir. 1992) (order).22 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (affirming, under a proportionalityanalysis, a sentence to twenty-­‐five years in prison for stealing golf clubs because thecrime was a third offense).
  
2011] McDonald's Other Right 29 sources, length of residence in the community, community ties,” and“the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or thecommunity that would be posed by the person’s release.”23 Andwhile the Bail Clause may still prevent individual judges from im-­‐posing conditions greater than necessary to accomplish the legisla-­‐ture’s goal, normal avenues of appellate review already serve thispurpose. Thus, as things stand, the Excessive Bail Clause protectsthe accused-­‐but-­‐not-­‐yet-­‐convicted from only the most extreme leg-­‐islatures and courts, and the most careless.24CONCLUSIONGiven the relative lack of controversy surrounding the ExcessiveBail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, even the most optimistic ofbail scholars would not have expected the Supreme Court to pro-­‐duce two hundred pages of opinion when the issue of its incorpora-­‐tion was settled. But even Eeyore would have confidently predictedthe question would receive a paragraph or two—in a case actuallypresenting the question. The fact that it did not tells us much aboutits present status.
23 Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2010).24 For a careless legislative action struck down by a court under the Bail Clause, seeUnited States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 601 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that releaserestrictions on sex offenders violate Excessive Bail Clause when the restrictions arespecifically mandated—including a mandate when the restrictions are unnecessary toprotect the community).
